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SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
ADVICE
MARK TUSHNET*
It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been
reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and
example, to decide the important question, whether societies of
men are really capable or not of establishing good government
from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and
force.'
-The Federalist No. 1
The spate of constitutional advice giving over the past decade or
two seems to have taken only part of Alexander Hamilton's
observation to heart. Advice givers appear to believe that they can
help others establish good government by reflection and choice.
They appear to ignore Hamilton's suggestion that the ability to
establish good government in that manner was reserved to the
people of the United States. True, the U.S. experience came early in
the constitution-writing enterprise, and accumulated wisdom
is-one might think-more widely available today than it was in
1787. And yet one might reflect as well on the fact that Hamilton's
characterization of the proposed U.S. Constitution was inaccurate
even when it was offered: The Constitution's drafters embedded a
large number of essentially unprincipled compromises in the
document they forwarded to the people for ratification, occasionally
but not always dressing them up in the garments of "reflection and
choice" as a tactic aimed at inducing support for the proposal.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Philipp
Dann, Vicki Jackson, Miguel Schor, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments.
1. THE FEDERALIST No.1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2003).
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My aim in this short Essay is to revive Hamilton's qualification,
shorn of course of its ethnocentricity. I suggest that what primarily
determines the content of constitutions are the intensely local
political considerations "on the ground" when the constitution is
drafted,2 and therefore that normative recommendations about what
"should" be included in a constitution or constitution-making
process are largely pointless.3 Scholars can accumulate information
about constitutions and their drafting and try to draw inferences
about what will work. Yet, predicating normative advice on such
studies is hazardous at best.4 The number of observations-
examples used to generate broader propositions-in the studies are
inevitably small.5 Perhaps they can support conclusions that are
statistically significant, but, as serious scholars understand,
statistical significance is not the same as social significance.
2. This Essay is limited to the subject of this Symposium--constitution drafting in post-
conflict situations where conflict between contending parties-typically, supporters of the
prior regime and insurgents who achieved enough success to force negotiations-persists in
the constitution-drafting process even if it has diminished substantially in other venues. See
infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
3. For a similar expression of skepticism, see Heinz Mug, Constitution-making,
Democracy and the "Civilizing" of Irreconcilable Conflict: What Might We Learn from the
South African Miracle?, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J. 269 (2007). See also id. at 270-71:
[M]y methodological claim [is] that learning from deeply textured examples is
more useful than the rigid application of models that may exacerbate existing
conflicts.... [T]he advisor or informed participant must be constantly aware of
the danger that they or other participants in any particular transitional process
will transform a context-laden example into a model they wish to advance in
order to achieve a specific advantage or strategic goal in the inevitably difficult
process of negotiating a new dispensation.
4. I regard this Essay as in the tradition of David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars
in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the
United States, 1974 WiS. L. REV. 1062, although based on less personal involvement in the
advice-giving project.
5. Donald Lutz, whose empirical studies use around eighty observations, cautions
against using such studies "to provide a master plan or a set of blueprints":
There are too many variables, most of which are not susceptible to human
control; ... the connections between independent and dependent variables are
often so imperceptible and far removed that they cannot be effectively utilized;
... and the human ability to create and learn new responses can make formerly
important variables irrelevant, and attempts at control counterproductive.
DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 19 (2006); see also id. at 183
("Constitutionalism and constitutional design are not defined by some set of principles that
can be ... mechanically applied.").
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In addition, normative advice will often have something like what
Adrian Vermeule calls a "self-defeating" character.6 Effective advice
must be compatible with the political incentives that the advice
receivers have. Yet those same incentives operate to induce the
advice receivers to search for solutions to their political problems;
for example, for institutional designs on which they and their
opponents can agree. One has to wonder whether external advisors
or expert participants can bring to the attention of politically
significant figures information that was not already available to
them,7 or that, if previously unavailable, will be fed into the local
political context as the basis for rational deliberation rather than
strategic maneuvering.8 I proceed anecdotally, with a series of
informal examples designed as provocations, although each is based
on evidence.9
6. Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 631 (2006).
7. In a comment made at the Symposium at which this Essay was presented in draft
form, Vicki Jackson observed that there have been innovations in constitutional design in
recent years, and that some participants in a particular constitution-making process may be
unaware of these new possibilities. One example is weak-form judicial review; another is the
use of nondomestic judges on domestic constitutional courts in the aftermath of conflicts
leaving each side suspicious of anyone associated with the other. I regard this as suggesting
some information-provision possibilities for external advice givers. In addition, in some
polities, expertise might be quite thin. Professional elites may not exist in substantial
numbers, or may remain in exile during the constitution-making process, or may be available
disproportionately to one side in the discussions. Local elites may not have a sufficiently wide
knowledge base about institutional solutions to the political problems they face. Eventually,
though, and I think in most real-world settings, there is a great deal of common knowledge
available to the domestic participants without prodding from outside advisors.
8. One can offer normative design advice on quite a high level of abstraction. Something
like this-M-'?ake sure that the institutions you create give those who lose particular political
contests incentives to continue to engage in political contention over other issues"-is going
to be good advice generally, although even here I would wonder about its force if the
particular contest at issue is one that the losing side believes to be essential to its continued
existence. But this advice is unlikely to provide much guidance on questions about the specific
structure of the legislative and executive branches.
9. I should emphasize that my position is one of skepticism, not of opposition. I do not
rule out the possibility that normative advice giving might sometimes be helpful. Perhaps my
skepticism could be taken as a suggestion for a different research project: not an inquiry into
what works well and what works badly, but into the conditions under which advice is
profitably taken, under which it is taken and transformed, and under which it is simply
ignored.
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I. AN INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE AND SOME COMMENTS ON WHY
ADVICE IS SOUGHT AND GIVEN
A useful starting point is the argument made by Cass Sunstein
in the early 1990s, with reference to the ongoing processes of
constitutional drafting and development in Central and Eastern
Europe. 0 Sunstein argued that the new constitutions in those
nations should not include protections for social and economic
rights." Sunstein began with the assumption that new democracies
had to enforce the first- and second-generation rights included in
their constitutions through the courts, and he worried that citizens
would not be able to distinguish between those rights and the third-
generation social and economic rights. 2 It followed, Sunstein
believed, that constitutional courts would have to enforce constitu-
tionally protected social and economic rights.'3
Sunstein's argument continued with the point that constitutional
courts would either take those protections seriously or they would
not, and whichever course the nation followed posed a danger to the
successful transition to a market-oriented democracy.' 4 If constitu-
tional courts took the protections seriously, there would be two
adverse consequences. First, enforcement of social and economic
rights-for example, rights to a decent wage or to decent hous-
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST
APPLICATION 225, 225-32 (Andr~s Saj6 ed., 1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Against Positive
Rights]. An earlier version of the argument appeared in Cass Sunstein, Against Positive
Rights, 2 E. EuR. CONST. REV. 35 (1993); see also Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 275 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)
(discussing the effects of amendment processes on the citizenry's sense of political efficacy).
11. See Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, supra note 10, at 225.
12. Id. at 229-30. Terminology here is sometimes a problem. By "first- and second-
generation rights," I mean the rights to civil and political participation, protected in classical
liberal political theory, bolstered by guarantees of equality that were often lacking when the
basic rights were first protected. By "third-generation rights," I mean social and economic
rights, but I do not exclude cultural rights from that category because, at least for present
purposes, nothing turns on whether cultural rights are included or excluded from the
category.
13. See id. at 229 (stating that it is "unrealistic to expect courts to enforce many positive
rights").




ing-would interfere with the transition to a market economy, in
which some would inevitably find themselves with unattractive jobs
and bad housing, because of the interaction among their human-
capital endowments, their choices, and the market demand for
labor." Second, such enforcement would interfere with the develop-
ment of a sense of democratic efficacy within a populace that had,
for several generations, been denied the power to affect economic
outcomes through political action. Enforcing social and economic
rights would shift power from the people's representatives to the
courts. 6
Suppose, though, that constitutional courts did not take social
and economic rights seriously. Again, there might be two adverse
consequences. Within the court system as a whole, judges might
observe that the constitutionally guaranteed social and economic
rights had no substantial legal effects, and might conclude that, as
a matter of law, the constitutionally guaranteed first- and second-
generation rights should have exactly the same legal status-that
is, should also have no substantial legal effect. 7 And within the
populace the nonenforcement of textually guaranteed social and
economic rights would perpetuate the cynical view, built up over
prior generations, that constitutions were merely paper, having
nothing to do with the lives people actually led.'"
Constitution drafters in Central and Eastern Europe did not take
Sunstein's advice. Guarantees of social and economic rights were
included in essentially all the constitutions adopted in the 1990s.'9
With what effects? None whatever--or at least no systematic effects.
Some nations in Central and Eastern Europe made the dual
transition to markets and democracy relatively easily, others with
more difficulty, and on a few the jury is still out. The one thing we
know, though, is that the inclusion of social and economic rights in





18. See id. at 229.
19. See, e.g., BULG. CONST. art. 48 (guaranteeing a right to work, safe working conditions,
and a minimum wage); HUNG. CONST. art. 70/B (guaranteeing a right to work and paid
holidays); SLOVK. CONST. art. 35(3) (guaranteeing all citizens the right to work).
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What can we conclude from this example? I offer one normative
and one positive observation. Sunstein was mistaken in part
because of a failure of imagination. Writing in the early 1990s, he
assumed that constitutional courts would have to engage in what I
have called strong-form judicial review, in which judicial orders
with respect to social and economic rights are strongly prescriptive
and detailed.2 ° Constitutional designers and implementers, in-
cluding constitutional courts, developed alternative forms of judicial
review and implemented them in the context of social and economic
rights.21 It turned out that constitutional courts could take social
and economic rights seriously without inevitably interfering with
either the transition to a market economy or the development of a
sense of political efficacy among the citizenry. The more general
point here is that normative advice is inevitably predicated on how
constitutional designs have worked, and it may turn out that
constitutional designers and implementers are more ingenious than
one might have thought.
The positive point is that Sunstein's advice was basically
irrelevant to his seemingly intended audience. Any constitution
adopted in the 1990s would have guarantees of social and economic
rights no matter what a normative advice giver said. Throughout
Europe-and including Central and Eastern Europe-social demo-
cratic ideas had penetrated deeply into constitutional consciousness.
Social democratic, Christian democratic, and Communist parties
had made the language of social and economic rights common
currency in the political arena. Proposing to omit guarantees of
social and economic rights would have been understood as proposing
to return to the late nineteenth century, not as proposing to join
the twentieth. International instruments, which were generally
20. For my most complete discussion of this assumption and related issues, see MARK
TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
21. For an important discussion dealing with Hungary, see Kim Lane Scheppele, A
Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1941-49 (2004). The case of South
Africa is more widely discussed. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Welfare Rights and Forms of
Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1903-08 (2004) (explaining that the celebrated case of
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Brootboom provides a good example of the
constitutional court rejecting one version of strong substantive rights). Sunstein
acknowledged that the development of weak-form review cast some doubt on his earlier
argument in CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 236-37 (2001).
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characterized as part of the new law of human rights, protected
social and economic rights.22 Perhaps only someone from the United
States, with its weak social democratic tradition,23 could think that
new constitutions could actually omit protections for social and
economic rights. The precise contours of politics varied from nation
to nation, of course, but everywhere the political context was such
that new constitutions would include such protections.
Taking this anecdote as a starting point, I now speculate about
why advice of this sort is sought and given. We should think
about both supply and demand. The supply side is, I think, rather
uninteresting. Participating in constitution-drafting projects is
intrinsically interesting to scholars of constitutional law, and
opportunities to do so arise infrequently. And there is always the
psychic charge that comes with the possibility of being regarded
as a James Madison for our times. The institutions that finance
scholars' advice giving may do so for purely academic reasons, to
gain credibility within the scholars' own nations, or-more inter-
estingly-to gain influence in the nation receiving the advice. This
last interest may be in influencing the shape of the new constitution
or in gaining some credit for assisting in creating the constitution,
to be cashed in later.
On the demand side, we should distinguish between external
demand, that is, demand from non-domestic participants that the
domestic constitution makers consult external experts, and internal
demand. I include within the category of "external" demand,
demand nominally from domestic participants induced by non-
domestic forces.24 In many situations, external forces-nations such
as the United States, which are important sources of external
capital, and organizations such as the United Nations-think it
22. According to the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, "[t]here are
nine core international human rights treaties," one of which is the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies?Pages?Human
RightsBodies.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
23. TUSHNET, supra note 20, at 228.
24. For a more elaborate typology, developed largely though not exclusively to assist in
assessing the normative validity of constitutions drafted under external influence, see Philipp
Dann & Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant-Constitution-Making Under
External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, in 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED
NATIONS LAW 423 (Armin von Bogdandy & Riidiger Wolfrum eds., 2006).
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important that a new domestic constitution have input from
external advice givers.2" Why they do so is irrelevant. Satisfying
their desires can have real payoffs. Some may be literal payoffs, if
the external forces are willing to provide material support to the
new government only if its constitution is drafted with external
advice. Others may be less tangible, such as enhanced credibility for
the new government on the international scene.
An interest in credibility may create some internal demand as
well. Political elites who agree to deals embedded in a proposed
constitution may be able to pacify some domestic opposition by
pointing to the fact that the deals had the endorsement of, or
perhaps even were suggested by, external advisors-and were not,
in particular, the result of self-dealing by the constitution drafters
alone. At the same time, though, provisions developed under the eye
of or attributed to external advisors might have less credibility than
purely domestic provisions.2" Suspicious citizens, and political
leaders who believe that they will do worse under the proposed
constitution than under other possible designs (or if the status quo
persists), may see the external advisors as sources of external
influence." These groups may believe that the advisors work for
some foreign entity, and that the provisions they propose or endorse
serve the interests of their masters.28 And this belief may be well-
founded, given the possibility that the advice is being supplied
precisely in order to gain influence.
25. At the extreme, external "advice" can take the form of imposition by external forces,
such as an occupying power. For a discussion of the distinction between "heteronomous" (that
is, imposed) and "autonomous" constitutions, see Jean L. Cohen, The Role of International
Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for "Interim
Occupations," 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 496 (2006-2007). Cohen treats these as dichotomous
categories, see id. at 498 n.2, but it is not incompatible with her analysis to treat them as lying
at the ends of a continuum.
26. For some examples, see Dann & Al-Ali, supra note 24, at 457-60.
27. Id.
28. My personal anecdotal support for this proposition comes from a consultation in which
I participated on the development of the first post-Ceaucescu constitution for Romania. The
group of consultants was sponsored by the American Bar Association's Central and Eastern
Law Initiative. At a press briefing, the group was asked, among other things, questions whose
clear subtexts were, "Are you shills for the United States government?" and "Are you shills
for the Romanian Communist Party?" See also id. (discussing impact of external advisors).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH ADVICE ABOUT SUBSTANCE AND STRUCTURE
The failure of imagination about constitutional design possibili-
ties has a cousin-the recommendation that constitution designers
include specific institutional and substantive provisions, identified
at such a high level of generality that the recommendation can be
accepted without consequence-by which I mean, without adverse
consequences to any politically significant element in the
constitution-making process. Here the advice will be followed, but
only because doing so is free.29
Consider two topics for constitutional design, one substantive and
one institutional. As with social and economic rights, modern
constitutions will include protections for first- and second-genera-
tion rights, such as those included in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.3" Yet including such rights in a constitu-
tion tells one essentially nothing about whether a society will
actually have a robust culture of free speech or equality. The reason
is, in part, that some constitutions are simply shams.3' Whether a
constitutional provision has life on the ground depends not on what
the constitution's text guarantees but rather on whether the
political forces in the society are arrayed in a way that gives
politically significant figures an interest in assuring that the rights
are respected. Even where constitutions are not shams, though, the
range of permissible interpretations of first- and second-generation
rights is wide enough to encompass quite large variations in actual
behavior. 2
29. If I knew enough economics, I would describe the advice to which I am referring as
"cheap talk."
30. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 19(2), Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (guaranteeing to all the right to freedom of expression).
31. See Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights
in Africa and the Enabling Role of Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern
Africa, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 20 (2007) (noting how the lack of independent review of laws
leads to sham constitutions).
32. Consider, for example, that the general limitations clause of the Canadian Charter of
Rights guarantees rights subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, § 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11 (U.K.). The Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted this clause in a manner that
reduces the number of situations in which rights restrictions are constitutionally permissible,
2008] 1481
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Perhaps structural provisions are different. With respect to
judicial review, however, I am skeptical. In the modern world
constitutions will almost inevitably include some form of constitu-
tional review.3 3 We know, though, that the design possibilities are
quite large. Since the early years of the twentieth century some of
the design issues have been apparent: Should the constitutional
court be specialized in constitutional law, or a generalist court with
jurisdiction over constitutional questions as well as other matters?
Should constitutional review be centralized in a constitutional court,
or diffused throughout the judicial system? Should constitutional
review be case-specific only, or should there be some sort of advisory
jurisdiction? If there is an advisory jurisdiction, should it be the
exclusive mode of constitutional review? How many judges should
sit on the constitutional court, and how long should their tenure be?
And, since the late twentieth century, a new question has been
added: Should constitutional review be strong-form, on the model of
the United States and Germany, or weak-form, on the model of
Canada and Great Britain?
I am similarly skeptical with respect to the separation of powers
structure. An advisor can certainly note that contemporary constitu-
tions ought to be committed to some form of separation of powers.34
But the separation of powers comes in various large-scale forms. In
but other, less protective interpretations are clearly possible. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R.
103 (Can.); see also ICCPR art. 19 (3), supra note 30, at 178, which qualifies the right to free
expression in these terms:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the
protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
33. Systems of pure parliamentary supremacy are clearly in retreat, with New Zealand,
Great Britain, and Israel all having instituted some form of judicial review since 1990. See
Gordon Silverstein, Sequencing the DNA of Comparative Constitutionalism: A Thought
Experiment, 65 MD. L. REv. 49, 49 & n.2 (2006). Only Australia holds out. See Miguel Schor,
Squaring the Circle: Democratizing Judicial Review and the Counter-Constitutional Difficulty,
16 MINN. J. INiVL L. 61, 101 n.249 (2007). I put aside constitutional revision processes in
authoritarian regimes such as China.
34. Even reasonably pure parliamentary systems can incorporate important separation
of powers elements. For a discussion, see Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers,
113 HARv. L. REv. 633 (2000); see also LItz, supra note 5, at 109-10 (describing common
methods of modyifing parliamentarism to incorporate some separation of powers).
1482 [Vol. 49:1473
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addition, nearly all advisors would agree that modest departures
from pure separation of powers principles-the allocation of a
concededly legislative power to the executive, for example-are
sometimes acceptable and even desirable. 5 Even more, sometimes
people will disagree over the basic characterization of a power, and
so over its proper allocation.3"
Proponents of specific choices will offer reasons for their preferred
choice. Those reasons will have two characteristics. First, they will
almost certainly be connected, I suspect fairly strongly, to the
nation's legal tradition. In the civilian tradition, legal interpretation
is conceptualized as far more formal and deductive than it is in the
common law tradition.37 That conceptualization has generated a
sense in those who design constitutions in nations with civilian
traditions that constitutional review should be concentrated in a
constitutional court whose judges will be chosen in a way to make
them at least somewhat more purposive and less deductive than the
judges in the ordinary courts.38 Reflection and choice play a smaller
role than tradition, and advice that is in tension with tradition may
have little purchase.
Second, the reasons offered to explain design choices will
generally be cast in terms of the consequences of one or the other
choice. Yet, once consequences are in the picture, so is politics.
Among the things on which constitution makers will reflect are
possible outcomes of the controversies they have in mind. True, they
are designing a constitution that they hope will have some staying
power and will allow the nation's institutions to address problems
of which the designers are at present unaware. But they also know
35. For example, the U.S. separation of powers system departs from purity in the
President's power to veto legislation, which is the allocation of a legislative power to the
executive, and in the Senate's role in the appointment of executive officials. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
36. For example, the majority in INS v. Chad/a, 462 U.S. 919, 924, 953 n.16 (1983),
characterized the power to waive a statutory requirement in a specific case where "extreme
hardship" was determined as an executive power, while Justice Powell characterized it as a
judicial one. Id. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring).
37. I emphasize that my concern here is with conceptualization, not reality.
38. This is only a sense, or what literary theorists might call an "elective affinity." The
Venezuelan constitutional scholar Allan R. Brewer-Carias has argued in great detail that
essentially every design choice can fit into both the common law and the civilian traditions.
See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARtAS, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 128, 186 (1989).
2008] 1483
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that the government they establish will have to face a number of
specific questions (varying, of course, from nation to nation). And
constitution makers will have different views on what the right
resolution of those questions should be. They will therefore specu-
late about whether one or another constitutional design choice will
make it more or less likely that their position on those contentious,
immediate questions will prevail.s9
These speculations will shape the design choices they make--or
on which they compromise. Perhaps this is a point at which advice
givers might profitably intervene with some suggestions. Suppose
one politically significant group prefers design choice A over design
choice B, which an opposing group supports. Because the groups
have settled on design choices with an eye toward the conse-
quences-the first group thinks that it is going to win more under
choice A than B, while the other makes exactly the reverse
prediction-they might get stuck. An advice giver might offer them
design choice C, observing that each has a "good enough" chance to
prevail on a range of important issues under C,4° that overcoming
the current impasse between A and B is really important to them,
and that-perhaps after the constitution is adopted--each side
can try to manipulate structure C to gain a more permanent
advantage.41 Here, the advice giver acts as a problem solver, offering
possible solutions to people who might not be able to devise their
own solutions because they are blinded by their prior commit-
ments.42
I would not rule out this role for normative advice giving, but I
would emphasize several of its characteristics. First, the claim that
39. Again, I emphasize that long-term considerations drop out of the calculation because
the constitution makers do not know what issues the nation will face in the future, or what
their positions would be on those unknown issues, or how particular design choices will affect
the outcomes of those issues. See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 94-95 (noting the imperfect
information faced by constitution makers and the conflict between short-term and long-term
interests).
40. I draw the term from BRUNO BETTELHEIM, A GOOD ENOUGH PARENT: A BOOK ON
CHILD-REARING (1987), without intending to endorse anything other than the idea that doing
well enough is often better than trying to do the best that one hopes for.
41. See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 225; see also Alicia L. Bannon, Note, Designing a
Constitution-Drafting Process: Lessons from Kenya, 116 YALE L.J. 1824, 1849 (2007)
(discussing ex post changes to Kenya's constitutional review process).
42. Innovations in constitutional design, such as those mentioned in note 7, supra, are
candidates for this form of advice giving.
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each side has a good enough chance to prevail has to be credible to
both sides.43 In some settings, one side might be quite skeptical,4
particularly when it sees its adversary buying into the proposal.45
Second, overcoming the impasse has to be more important than
maintaining the status quo. This will not always be so. Third, and
probably most important for present purposes, choice C has to be
something that the contending parties would not come up with on
their own. It must be something outside their initial vision of
possible design choices. And here, I think, there may be two
difficulties. I wonder whether there are any such choices in today's
world. Political actors involved in the constitution-making process
already have, I believe, quite a wide vision. It is unclear to me what
an outsider can offer.46 In addition, the very fact that a choice is
offered by an outsider might have either good effects-because the
idea comes from a neutral as between the contending forces-or bad
ones. The bad effects would arise when outsiders are viewed as
partisan (notwithstanding the subjective views of the outsiders).47
An example is provided by the question, which all contemporary
constitutional designers must confront, of the legislature's size.4"
From early on it has been clear that a legislature should be neither
too large nor too small, because in either case the legislative process
is likely to be dominated by a small group-in the latter case by the
entire small legislature, and in the former by the leadership group
that will inevitably emerge to manage the massive legislature's
43. See Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making and Its Pathology in Iraq, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 534, 542 (2006-2007) ('ITihe paradigm of constitution-making depends
on the coordination and the compliance of many instances, and of course mutual trust ....").
44. See id. at 548 (noting the mistrust among groups while drafting the Iraqi constitution).
45. The thought would be something like this: If my adversaries think they have a good
enough chance to prevail, perhaps they know something I don't about how this institution will
operate. I think I have a good enough chance to prevail, but maybe they are right in thinking
that they have a better chance-in which case I ought to withhold my consent.
46. There will often be domestic legal experts that constitution drafters call upon, who
may share much of the knowledge that external advisors possess.
47. I believe that some participants involved in contemporary post-conflict constitution-
making projects are unlikely to consider any advice from an American as neutral-even when
the advice is from a scholar formally unaffiliated with the government of the United States.
See, e.g., Arato, supra note 43, at 457-58 (discussing the "pathology of illegitimacy" resulting
from the American influence during the construction of Iraq's interim constitution).
48. See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 221 (noting that empirical evidence suggests legislature size
has some "underlying logic").
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operations.49 It also seems to be an empirically verifiable fact that
legislative size tends to be a close approximation of the cube root of
a nation's population. 50 I suspect that an external advisor who
recommended that the legislature's size be set at that figure would
be regarded as a lunatic."' Still, sometimes an advisor observing the
course of discussions of legislative size might observe that those
discussions seemed to be converging on a figure far removed from
the cube root of the nation's population. The advisor might point
out that other constitution designers seemed to think the proposed
size was too small or too large. Note as well that the cube-root
"guideline" is not something that is likely to jump out during
deliberations, nor is it likely to be common knowledge." Thus, the
external advisor's comment might push the constitution makers to
modify their positions.
Still, it seems worth noting that the drafters almost certainly
would be converging on a "mis-sized" legislature for local political
reasons, and that bringing the cube-root guideline into the discus-
sion would probably give some participants a new argument for the
positions they had already been asserting. 53 Further, as Professor
Lutz notes, the cube-root guideline appears to be a natural out-
growth of deliberations over legislative size, not a rationally
prescribed rule.54 He explains that "those who design constitutions
unconsciously struggle toward a similar sense of what is fair and
workable in a constitutional republic."55 Bringing this knowledge
into consciousness might impair its utility in the design process.56
49. Id. at 101-02.
50. See id. (describing the evidence).
51. See id. at 233 ("There is no inherent rationality to following the cube root rule.").
52. See id. at 102.
53. See id. at 233-34.
54. See id. at 233.
55. Id. at 102 (emphasis added); see also id. at 234 (describing the outcome as "an
impressively consistent logic-in-use").
56. Lutz provides similar examples, subject to similar comments. He observes that short
constitutions tend to be difficult to amend because they are "simple framework document[s],"
while long constitutions tend to be easier to amend because they contain detailed
prescriptions that can be made obsolete by social and economic developments. Id. at 222-23.
From this we might derive the prescription: "Make your constitution relatively easy to amend
if you are moving in the direction of a long constitution." I suspect that this is a common sense
prescription. Even if it is something that an advisor can bring to a designer's attention, it tells
them almost nothing about exactly how easy amendment should be.
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The most general of my points is this: participants in the
constitution-making process have goals that partially converge and
partially diverge." With varying degrees of commitment, they want
to get a constitution adopted. Then, with the constitution in place,
they want their own particular policies to be adopted. With respect
to each component of constitutional design, each participant will
make some judgment about the degree to which a particular design
will make more or less likely that its preferred policies will be
adopted. What can an outside advisor contribute to the design
process? Advice to one participant that a design feature that has
been overlooked will increase the chance that the participant's
preferred policy will be adopted actually is unhelpful because that
very thing makes the feature less attractive to other participants.
Sometimes the advisor might be able to identify a design
alternative that makes it less likely than the alternatives on the
table that any participant will achieve what it wants, but nonethe-
less makes it possible for each participant to anticipate winning
what it wants with some probability. This kind of advice might be
helpful when achieving an agreement is more desirable than
ensuring substantive outcomes after the constitution is adopted. It
is not that the feature is a component of good government in some
general sense but rather that its adoption will solve an immediate
political problem without guaranteeing future political defeats.58
Yet, to the extent that politics is what matters, present and
future, I am quite skeptical about the proposition that outsiders will
be able to improve on the calculations internal participants already
make. Perhaps they can bring into the discussion facts about how
design features are likely to work, which will assist the participants
in their political calculations. Also, perhaps those facts will not be
common knowledge, and the participants will actually take the
outsider's factual presentation seriously. The conditions for success
seem to me rather restrictive, though.
A final perspective on the problems discussed here comes from
thinking about the implications of a quite minimalist view of
constitutionalism's requirements. Under this minimalist view,
constitutionalism requires only "(a) regular, open, and competitive
57. See id. at 225.
58. See Arato, supra note 43, at 538.
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elections; (b) freedoms of speech and press; and (c) well-functioning,
relatively independent courts."59 It seems clear that these require-
ments can be met by a huge number of institutional designs, that a
large number of those institutional designs are common knowledge
among all constitution designers, and that these requirements can
be met only when there is political support for constitutionalism
itself. In other words, if the political system is ready to accept
constitutionalism, the particulars of constitutional design do not
matter, and so neither will normative constitutional advice giving.
Similarly, if the political system is not ready to accept consti-
tutionalism, the particulars of constitutional design do not matter,
and neither will normative constitutional advice giving.
As Learned Hand said, "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and
women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can
save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help
it."'6 In the United States, Hand's comment is typically offered as a
caution against relying too heavily on judicial review as a mecha-
nism for avoiding the implementation of unconstitutional legisla-
tion. Hand, however, was addressing constitutionalism itself, and
perhaps all I have done is flesh out some reasons for thinking that
he was right.
III. PROBLEMS WITH ADVICE ABOUT PROCESS
I turn now from choices with respect to the institutions of an
ongoing political system to choices with respect to the constitution-
making process itself. At a fairly high level of abstraction, the advice
is straightforward: Design the process of constitution making and
adoption to ensure that all elites representing political forces with
significant amounts of power-mostly power to disrupt arrange-
ments of which they disapprove-end up committed to expending a
reasonable amount of effort to make the arrangements work after
they go into effect.6 ' I will call this ensuring buy-in by political
59. VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 459-60 (2d
ed. 2006).
60. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
61. See BREWER-CARfAS, supra note 38, at 63 (noting that the U.S. Constitution rose from
a series of compromises between the ruling classes and the interests of democracy).
1488 [Vol. 49:1473
NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ADVICE
elites. Secondarily, the advice is: Do what you can to get similar
buy-in from the population generally.62
Of course, the difficulty lies in giving more content to these
prescriptions. The mechanisms of gaining elite buy-in are quite
varied. Discussion in parliament, extra-parliamentary round table
negotiations, and development of constitutional drafts by experts for
discussion in a constituent assembly, which itself can be selected in
a wide variety of ways, are just a few of the available mechanisms. 63
Under some arrays of political power, almost anything will do.
Under others, perhaps only one or two mechanisms will produce
sufficient buy-in. The particular institutional mechanism for
eliciting elite buy-in will depend quite heavily on the array of
political forces on the ground."
Consider, for example, two common situations. In the first
situation-call it revolutionary transformation-the political elites,
who previously controlled the nation, have been decisively defeated
and have lost all political power. The most obvious example occurred
in the United States, where the loyalist supporters of the prior
regime fled the new nation in droves.65 In such a situation, revolu-
tionary leaders will bargain among themselves, 66 and will be
unlikely to welcome, or even need, anything other than expert
advice on technical details.67
62. Buy-in by both elites and the population is likely to be increasingly difficult as the
degree of heteronomy increases. See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 14 (noting the importance of
popular consent).
63. Under what I suspect are unusual circumstances, elite buy-in might occur by means
of ratification of an expert-drafted constitution in a popular referendum. See Arato, supra note
43, at 540.
64. For an argument that recent developments in constitution making have created a
better model for eliciting the necessary buy-in, see id. at 539-40. Arato acknowledges that the
model rests on a relatively small number of cases, and I would add that the apparent failure
of the constitution-making process in Iraq seems to have multiple parents.
65. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 113 (Modern Library ed.
2002).
66. See BREWER-CARtAS, supra note 38, at 63 (noting that the U.S. Constitution resulted
from compromises among the former colonies).
67. By "technical details," I mean such things as ensuring that the terms used in one
provision are compatible with the terms used in another (whether compatibility lies in using
the same terms or deliberately using different ones), that electoral timetables are coordinated
in the way the drafters truly desire, and the like.
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In the other common situation, elements of the prior regime
retain significant power and must be accommodated. Here the
negotiations will have to include these elements, as in South Africa
and the roundtable negotiations in Central and Eastern Europe in
the early 1990s.68 This is also the case with many nominally
imposed constitutions, such as the one used to absorb the German
Democratic Republic (GDR) into the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG). 9 The FRG had to accommodate some matters of concern to
the population in the former GDR, even though the GDR's political
collapse was complete. In Japan, elite buy-in appears to have
occurred through the process of getting the Japanese parliament to
endorse-as truly Japanese-the translation of an American-drafted
constitution. °
The examples of Germany and Japan suggest the difficulty of
moving more than a step or two away from the most general
prescriptions. I doubt that anyone would have thought, before the
event, that it would matter as much as it seems to have mattered
that the Japanese parliament had to translate the draft constitution
from English.71 Imagine a conversation within the U.S. occupying
forces: 'We've drafted a constitution in English. Let's translate it
into Japanese and then secure buy-in by having the Japanese
themselves ratify the constitution." Would anyone have thought to
say, 'Wait a minute. We can get better buy-in by having them
translate it themselves."? Translation, which certainly looks like a
mainly technical enterprise, turned out to be politically significant
in ways that a normative advice giver probably would not have
anticipated.72
Getting popular buy-in is, as I have suggested, secondary. Its
absence will matter only if some political leader sees an opportunity
for political gain in appealing to members of the public who would
68. See Arato, supra note 43, at 538.
69. On the integration of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG), see Inga Markovits, Constitution Making After National
Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1307 (2008).
70. That is how I interpret the narrative offered in RAYA. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON,






have not bought in. In the short run, if political elites have bought
in, the chance that such a leader will emerge is small, though not
zero. The opportunist leader may have been biding his or her time,
or may have explicitly refused to buy in to the new constitution
precisely to preserve the possibility of mobilizing the public against
it. That the possibility is not zero counsels in favor of gaining public
buy-in; that the possibility is likely to be small counsels in favor of
not expending enormous energy on doing so. 3
Indeed, that seems to be the pattern. Modern constitution making
appears to require some form of popular ratification of a proposed
constitution.7 4 The ratification may take the form of an up-or-down
referendum. An alternative, recent practice in several nations,
including South Africa, has been widely admired by commentators.75
A constitution is drafted by experts and debated and modified by a
mechanism that aims at ensuring elite buy-in. The proposed
constitution is then widely circulated throughout the nation, with
significant efforts made to educate the public about its content.76
There are public discussions and some means by which members of
the public can submit comments and suggestions for modification.77
These suggestions are considered by some elite-dominated body, and
then the constitution, put in final form, is submitted to the public
for ratification.78
73. See Bannon, supra note 41, at 1842, 1848 (summarizing the lessons learned from the
drafting process in Kenya).
74. See JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 288-89. 1 note here the mixed pattern with
respect to the proposed Treaty for a Constitution for Europe. Some nations regarded the
proposal as a treaty, which it was in form, and used their regular methods of treaty
ratification, that is, endorsement by the national legislature. Others regarded it as a proposed
constitution, and sought popular ratification in referenda, even in nations where referenda
are not a normal mode of law making. EU Constitution: Where Member States Stand, BBC
NEWS, Mar. 25, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm; The
Constitution Ratification, http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty
_ConstRat.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). I have qualified my assertion with the word
"modern" to take into account the U.S. experience of ratification by special popularly elected
assemblies in the states. Even there, the special elections generated some degree of popular
buy-in.
75. For some sources, see JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 287-89.
76. See id. at 283, 287-88 (discussing the process in South Africa).
77. See id. at 287-88.
78. See id. at 277 (noting that constitutional referenda appear to be gaining in popularity).
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These mechanisms do obtain some degree of public buy-in at
relatively low cost. 9 The consultative processes have, I believe,
generally resulted in no more than cosmetic changes to the proposed
constitution. And the up-or-down referenda have been, I believe,
basically rubber stamps.5s These outcomes are entirely expectable.
The initial constitutions, whether submitted to the consultative
process or placed on the ballot directly, result from negotiations
among political elites. If they have truly bought into their own
proposals, they will be willing to make only cosmetic changes to
their work.s l Indeed, they are likely to campaign for the ratification
of their work."s What makes them political elites is that, as a
general matter, they can get their way in politics. "As a general
matter" is not the same as "always," though, and there is an ever-
present possibility of slippage between the political elites who
negotiated the proposed constitution and the public that is asked to
ratify it. Here too, it is doubtful that an external advice giver will be
in an especially good position--compared to a domestic analyst
-both to observe slippage occurring and to caution, effectively, the
political elites against the course they are pursuing."
Before concluding, I think it useful to bring to the fore one theme
in the preceding argument that deserves specific mention. Perhaps
79. Public buy-in can come gradually, as the nation's political experience generates
confidence among the public that the original institutional design works reasonably well. Of
course, governmental failures early on may lead the public to conclude that the constitution
was badly designed from the outset. See id. at 290.
80. See id. at 288. But see Bannon, supra note 41, at 1845, 1869-70 (describing the
rejection by referendum of a proposed constitutional revision in Kenya). My interpretation of
the events Bannon describes is that the constitutional revision did not have sufficiently broad
elite buy-in, and became a vehicle for the entrenchment of one of the opposing forces
participating in the revision process.
81. Making some changes is probably a good idea. This shows the public that the
consultation actually had some effect, albeit a modest one. The changes, however, are likely
to be cosmetic because the elites will have already bought in to resolutions of their major
differences and will be unlikely to want to reopen the discussions of important and
contentious matters.
82. See Bannon, supra note 41, at 1845 (discussing a government campaign for ratification
in Kenya).
83. Here my formulation is designed to deal with situations in which external advice
givers see a train wreck about to occur (that is, observe the slippage as it occurs), and to
express skepticism about the efficacy of pointing out to the elites that the train wreck is about




an outsider can give advice, not on constitutional substance or
processes for constitutional adoption, but on the processes for
reaching agreement. Advisors who know something about negotia-
tion, bargaining, and the like might be able to move negotiations
forward, acting essentially as mediators do in nonjudicial dispute
resolution processes. To the extent that the demand for advice is
based on an interest in gaining legitimacy from consulting experts
in constitutional law, the advisors must have that expertise as
well.84 Whether specialists in constitutional law as such have
expertise as mediators is a separate question.85
CONCLUSION
I have sketched some reasons for skepticism about the proposition
that external observers can offer normative advice to guide the
"reason and choice" of contemporary constitution makers. Perhaps
some negative recommendations are possible. I wonder whether the
recommendations deal with matters of common knowledge among
constitutional drafters and whether the advice will be taken in
circumstances where bad ideas are on the table.
Consider two such recommendations. The first is that it is a
dramatically bad idea to have a parliamentary system in which the
prime minister is elected independently of the parliamentary
majority.8" The second is that it is a pretty bad idea to combine a
84. See Bannon, supra note 41, at 1865-66.
85. Bannon's note deserves special mention here. See id. The author provides a careful
analysis of the politics associated with the failed constitution-drafting process in Kenya. She
identifies the political interests that were accommodated in the drafting process and explains
how the accommodations that were reached contributed to the process's failures. She
concludes with a series of recommendations that, if followed, might have led to a successful
outcome. Her argument is carefully qualified but would be strengthened had she recognized
the self-defeating character of her recommendations. For example, she recommends that
national politicians be excluded from the drafting process. Id. at 1866-67. Sometimes that
might be possible, but in the circumstances she describes, there were political reasons for
their inclusion in the process. And, if a renewed process does exclude politicians, it will be
because the contours of politics have changed, not because "reason and choice" dictate their
exclusion.
86. Israel tried this for one election cycle and then abandoned the experiment. Compare
Basic Law: The Government § 3(b), 1992, S.H. 1396, at 214, available at http://www.
mfa.gov.il/MFAIMFAArchive/1990-1995/Basic%2OLaw-%2OThe%20-Government%20-1992-
('The Prime Minister serves by virtue of his being elected in the national general elections,
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strong president with an independently elected parliament chosen
through proportional representation with a relatively low threshold
for participation in parliament. The difficulties with these designs
are either obvious from the start, as with the separate election of a
prime minister, which gives perverse incentives to voters concerned
about the aggregation of power in one person's or party's hands, or
from widely known experience.
Beyond the question of common knowledge, though, one has to
wonder what the political circumstances are that produce an
interest among political elites in advancing these bad ideas. Take
the presidentialism scenario for example. The proposal might be on
the table because there is one faction with a substantial plurality
and a strong leader, and many other factions. The plurality faction
may push for a strong presidency, anticipating that its leader, who
genuinely does tower above other politicians, will be chosen as
president. The other factions may want proportional representation
in the legislature. Will the constitution drafters heed the advice that
they are moving toward a bad design? Perhaps. But the political
situation I have described, for example, will not change, and the
drafters will search for close substitutes: a strong president with one
or more independently elected vice-presidents who must approve
major actions, for example. Yet, I am reasonably confident that, in
the posited political circumstances, institutional variants that might
be politically acceptable substitutes for the strong presidency are
going to pose some of the same dangers and perhaps even to almost
exactly the same degree.
Negative recommendations have their own peril. The intuition
behind such recommendations is that the drafters of one constitu-
tion can learn from other people's mistakes. Indeed, this is true, in
the sense that they do not make the same mistakes other people
to be conducted on a direct, equal, and secret basis ...."), with Basic Law: The Government,
2001, S.H. 1780, at 158, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/aws/special/eng/basicl4
_eng.htm (omitting that provision).
87. This is the lesson taught by Juan Linz's studies of presidentialism in Latin America.
See generally JUAN J. LINZ & ARTURO VALENZUELA, THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (1994). Sometimes the lesson is stated more
broadly, as a proposition about presidentialism as such, or about combining presidentialism
with a parliamentary system. The U.S. experience shows that the former version is
overstated; the French experience shows that the latter is overstated.
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have made. Instead, they make their own new mistakes. For
example, they might forgo an institutional design on the ground
that it worked badly elsewhere, when it might work reasonably well
in one's own political circumstances. Accepting negative recommen-
dations, that is, might be as bad as accepting positive ones.
To restate my overall theme: institutional design results far more
from on-the-ground political circumstances than from reason and
choice.88 Normative advice giving might occasionally have some
beneficial effects, but in general the advice will be dominated by
politics. In our capacity as scholars, we are better off observing what
happens as constitutions are designed and implemented and trying
to figure out why what happens happens, rather than offering
normative advice on good constitutional design.89
88. See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 3.
89. Some scholars are participants in processes of constitutional design and should
participate as political actors in those processes. At this point, of course, the argument
becomes entirely reflexive: scholars offering normative design advice are intervening in a
political process as political actors. Perhaps, then, all that I am asking is that such scholars
be aware that their interventions are political and not merely technical.
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